Armstrong's sparse theory of universals permits only those universals that do genuine causal-explanatory work, and non-maximal determinables like 'mass' figure irreducibly in Newton's second law.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
A fundamental physics equation (F = ma) that describes how force, mass, and acceleration relate to each other.
Non-maximal determinables(the type of properties Armstrong thinks still deserve to exist)
General properties that aren't at the most specific level of detail (like 'mass' is non-maximal because it doesn't specify an exact amount—it's broader than a specific mass value).
Sparse theory of universals(Armstrong's main contribution to philosophy)
A philosophical view that says only the most fundamental, necessary properties actually exist in reality—not every possible property we can think of.
determinables(Philosophy of properties and universals)
General properties (e.g., redness, color) that are instantiated by more specific determinate properties (e.g., scarlet, crimson); their mind-independent reality is disputed by anti-realists
universals(Debated in Lefèvre's Disceptatio de universali between two students of Chrysippus's academy)
Either what particular classes of things share, or what those who reason say they share (decided by convention)