Armstrong's sparse universals ontology holds that only fully determinate properties are genuine universals; determinables are merely nominalistically useful predicates with no distinct ontological status.
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What kind of thing something is considered to be or how real it exists—for example, whether something is a physical object, a concept, a property, or something else entirely.
Ontology(Carnap argues this enterprise is based on a mistake)
The philosophical discipline that tries to answer hard questions about what there really is.
Sparse universals ontology(the main view being described)
A theory about what exists that says only the most basic, fundamental properties are real, rather than every concept or category we use being equally real.
determinables(Philosophy of properties and universals)
General properties (e.g., redness, color) that are instantiated by more specific determinate properties (e.g., scarlet, crimson); their mind-independent reality is disputed by anti-realists
universals(Debated in Lefèvre's Disceptatio de universali between two students of Chrysippus's academy)
Either what particular classes of things share, or what those who reason say they share (decided by convention)