Assuming truthmaker necessitarianism, the truthmaker criterion for particulars entails that a theory is ontologically committed to a particular only if the existence of that particular is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the theory.
The actual objects of the world that are directly accessible only through perception and are ineffable — they cannot be captured or referred to by words
truthmaker necessitarianism(Assumed in deriving the consequences of the truthmaker criteria for particulars and kinds)
The view that truthmakers necessitate the truths they make true, such that the existence of the truthmaker is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the relevant proposition or theory.
The truthmaker account of ontological commitment—like the quantifier account, but for an entirely different reason—has a problem with capturing implicit commitment. The problem arises because the truthmakers for a theory, but not the ontological commitments of a theory, are entities whose existence is sufficient for the truth of the theory. The problem afflicts both the truthmaker criterion for particulars, and for kinds. Indeed, assuming truthmaker necessitarianism, it follows from the former c