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    Autonomy and freedom of conscience support separating leg... — Carmelics
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    Supports→A positivist conception of law — specifically a version of the Separation Thesis — is normatively justified on the grounds of autonomy and freedom of conscience.

    Autonomy and freedom of conscience support separating legal requirements from moral requirements in at least some spheres of conduct.

    Rights & LibertySocial Contract
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    Rights & LibertySocial Contract

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    A positivist conception of law — specifically a version of the Separation Thesis...The Separation Thesis holds that the question of what the law is ought to be dis...There are compelling normative arguments in favor of adopting a positivist conce...

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    As explained in the next sub-section, Dworkin’s methodological view incorporates some prescriptive elements. But one prominent advocate of an exclusively prescriptive project is Neil MacCormick (MacCormick 1985; see also Campbell 1996; Murphy 2001; Postema 1989; Schauer 1996; Waldron 2001). MacCormick argues that there are compelling normative arguments in favor of adopting a positivist conception of law. In particular, he suggests that values like autonomy and freedom of conscience demand that

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