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    Bayesian evidential support has an eliminative nature — Carmelics
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    Supports→Bayesian logic of evidential support does not require precise values for prior probabilities

    Bayesian evidential support has an eliminative nature

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    Bayesian evidential support only needs bounds on the values of comparative plaus...Bayesian logic of evidential support does not require precise values for prior p...These bounds only play a significant role while evidence remains fairly weak

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Any account of evidential support that requires greater informativenes...84%A proposition that explains an evidential statement thereby receives e...82%The evidential support or refutation of a hypothesis is relative to wh...82%The Bayesian account of evidential support extends the hypothetical-de...81%

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    Thus, Bayesian logic of inductive support for hypotheses is a form of eliminative induction, where the evidence effectively refutes false alternatives to the true hypothesis. Because of its eliminative nature, the Bayesian logic of evidential support doesn’t require precise values for prior probabilities. It only needs to draw on bounds on the values of comparative plausibility ratios, and these bounds only play a significant role while evidence remains fairly weak. If the true hypothesis is ass

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