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    Because the gap is not specific to any particular object,... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Challenges→The gap strategy fails to explain why a particular object has a given property.

    Because the gap is not specific to any particular object, it cannot explain why object a specifically has F as one of its properties.

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    Consciousness & Mind

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    A property F has a gap regardless of whether any specific object fills it.The gap strategy fails to explain why a particular object has a given property.

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    A property F has a gap regardless of whether any specific object fills...

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    A typical line for those convinced that the regress is vicious has consisted in proposing that instantiation is not a relation, or at least not a normal one. Some philosophers hold that it is a sui generis linkage that hooks things up without intermediaries. Peter Strawson (1959) calls it a non-relational tie and Bergmann (1960) calls it a nexus. Broad (1933: 85) likened instantiation to glue, which just sticks two sheets of paper together, without needing anything additional; similarly, instant

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