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It is not the case that Behavioral and neurological evidence shows animals form internal representations that guide goal-directed action in ways functionally identical to belief.
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1.
Functional similarity doesn't guarantee identical mechanisms; animal navigation may use non-representational processes like gradient-following.
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2.
Beliefs require propositional content and conscious access; animal systems may lack the conceptual structure necessary for genuine representation.
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3.
Equivocating 'internal representation' across neurons, maps, and intentional states obscures whether animals have beliefs versus mere information-processing.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Animals demonstrate flexible, context-sensitive behavior adjusting to novel situations, requiring internal models rather than reflexive responses.
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2.
Neural correlates of planning, memory integration, and counterfactual reasoning exist in non-human brains, implementing representational processes.
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3.
Functional equivalence in goal-direction suffices for belief attribution; intentionality requires only appropriate causal role, not consciousness.
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