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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Behavioral equivalence to a minded system does not entail ontological equivalence with that system, as philosophical zombies illustrate (Chalmers, 1996).

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If zombies are truly inconceivable upon careful analysis, the premise of the argument collapses, making the distinction empirically unmotivated.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Ontological equivalence may follow if consciousness just is a higher-order functional property, making behavioral equivalence sufficient for mentality.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The argument conflates epistemic limits (what we can know from behavior) with metaphysical facts (what actually exists), committing a modal fallacy.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Conceivability of zombies (physically identical but non-conscious beings) is coherent, suggesting consciousness is metaphysically distinct from behavior.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Two systems can be functionally and behaviorally identical yet differ in intrinsic phenomenal properties like subjective experience or qualia.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Physical science describes structure and function, not subjective experience, so behavioral equivalence cannot logically entail consciousness.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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