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    Berkeley's idealism demonstrates that spatial extension i... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Sensible particulars must possess certain general characteristics in order to exemplify forms

    Berkeley's idealism demonstrates that spatial extension is not a necessary condition for exemplifying universal properties, since mental particulars instantiate redness, roundness, and other forms without occupying physical space.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Mental images and sensations genuinely possess phenomenal properties like redness without occupying Cartesian physical space.
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    • 2.Universal properties are abstract; their instantiation needn't require spatial location, only appropriate instantiating particulars.
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    • 3.Berkeley's idealism successfully explains how minds grasp universals directly without mediating physical extension between mind and property.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Mental particulars arguably have spatiotemporal structure within phenomenal space, so Berkeley hasn't eliminated spatial extension entirely.
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    • 2.Redness in experience differs fundamentally from redness-as-universal; one is qualitative, the other structural—conflating them begs the question.
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    • 3.Berkeley must explain how non-spatial minds consistently instantiate properties requiring structural organization that space naturally provides.
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    Key Terms

    Berkeley(as the author being discussed)
    George Berkeley was an Irish philosopher from the 1600s-1700s who argued that physical objects don't exist independently of being perceived—they only exist because someone is thinking about or observing them.
    Mental particulars(as examples of things that have properties like redness without physical form)
    Specific individual things that exist only in the mind, like your thoughts, feelings, or imagined objects.
    Universal properties(as qualities that don't require physical space)
    Qualities or characteristics that can apply to many different things (like 'redness' or 'roundness' that multiple objects can share).
    idealism(Presented as a consequence of the coherence theory of truth, but not exclusive to it)
    The view that one's beliefs constitute the world
    instantiate(as used in metaphysics)
    To be a concrete example of something, or to have and display a particular property or category.
    necessary condition(Counterfactual analysis of causation; Mackie 1965, 1974)
    A condition C is necessary for event E if E would not have occurred in the absence of C
    spatial extension(describing properties of physical bodies)
    The idea that something takes up space—it has length, width, and depth. For physical objects, this is a basic feature of what makes them physical.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Proof of definition segments1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Berkeley must explain how non-spatial minds consistently instantiate properties ...Berkeley's idealism successfully explains how minds grasp universals directly wi...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Mental images and sensations genuinely possess phenomenal properties like rednes...
    Mental particulars arguably have spatiotemporal structure within phenomenal spac...
    +3 moreShow less
    Redness in experience differs fundamentally from redness-as-universal; one is qu...Sensible particulars must possess certain general characteristics in order to ex...Universal properties are abstract; their instantiation needn't require spatial l...