Bernard Williams's integrity objection shows that pre-theoretical judgments about agent-relative preferences often track deep commitments to personal projects and relationships, not mere moral intuitions.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
integrity objection(Bernard Williams' moral philosophy, primarily in 'Utilitarianism: For and Against' and 'Moral Luck')
Williams' critique of utilitarianism that concerns not whether utilitarianism prescribes the right actions, but whether the kind of deliberative considerations utilitarianism employs (impersonal aggregation of utilities) adequately accounts for the agent's personal moral commitments and projects
moral intuitions(Metaethics discussion of intuitionism)
Intellectual seemings — cognitive states in which certain moral propositions appear true to the subject