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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Biological altruism cannot be equated with altruism in the everyday vernacular sense.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Biological altruism is defined in terms of fitness consequences, not motivating intentions.
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    • 2.Everyday vernacular altruism requires conscious intention to help.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Thomas Nagel's 'The Possibility of Altruism' grounds genuine altruism in agent-neutral reasons that require phenomenal access to others' interests.
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    • 2.Inclusive fitness models describe causal-mechanical population dynamics with no representational or intentional states as explanatory primitives.
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    • 3.A concept defined solely by causal consequence relations is categorically distinct from a concept whose extension is fixed by first-person motivational structure.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ned Block's distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness entails that behavior-shaping states without phenomenal character lack morally relevant intentionality.
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    • 2.Worker bees exhibiting inclusive fitness 'altruism' possess no access-conscious representation of conspecific welfare as a reason for action.
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    • 3.Vernacular altruism, as analyzed in the Kantian tradition, requires that the agent's maxim include the beneficiary's good as an end, which presupposes representational content absent in biological fitness accounts.
      ?

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