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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Boghossian and Velleman (1989) show that color experience represents objects as having properties that nothing actually instantiates, constituting systematic representational error.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Colors might be dispositions to cause experiences rather than intrinsic properties, making color experience veridical rather than erroneous.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Calling systematic misrepresentation 'error' assumes we know the content of color experience independently, which is precisely what's disputed.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If color experience evolved to track ecologically relevant surface properties, it succeeds functionally even if physics describes properties differently.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Color experiences present objects as intrinsically colored, but physics shows color depends on observer properties like lighting and visual systems.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If experiences systematically misrepresent their objects' actual properties, this explains the appearance-reality gap in color perception.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Representationalism about experience requires specifying what properties are represented; if none match reality, systematic error follows logically.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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