Bolzano's principle G presupposes a unique decomposition of mental content into propositions, but Frege's context principle shows propositional identity is use-relative, not intrinsic.
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Whether two different statements or sentences should be counted as expressing the exact same idea or meaning.
context principle(Frege's methodological principle invoked to reframe how numbers can be epistemically accessible)
Words have meaning only in the context of a proposition, not in isolation
mental content(Davidsonian account)
The content of propositional mental states such as belief, determined through causal relations between speakers and objects in the world and through the rational integration of speakers' behaviour.
principle G(as a technical proposal about the structure of thought)
A specific rule or law that Bolzano proposed about how mental content (the ideas in our minds) should be structured or divided up.
propositions(Answer to the question of what metaphysical category propositions belong to)
Entities belonging to a sui generis metaphysical category of their own kind, not reducible to other categories
use-relative(as a way of describing how meaning works according to Frege)
Something that depends on how it's actually used in practice, rather than being fixed or unchanging on its own.