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    Brentano's thesis that intentionality constitutes an irre... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Intentionality does not pose insurmountable semantic problems.

    Brentano's thesis that intentionality constitutes an irreducible mark of the mental entails that no purely extensional or physicalist semantic apparatus can fully capture directedness toward objects.

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    Key Terms

    Brentano(the philosopher whose hypothesis is being discussed)
    Franz Brentano was a 19th-century philosopher who argued that consciousness is the defining feature of mental states—basically, that what makes something a thought or feeling is that it's about something and we're aware of it.
    Directedness toward objects(the capacity that the statement says cannot be captured by physicalist approaches)
    The way that thoughts and mental states point toward or are about particular things; for example, a belief is directed toward whatever it's a belief about.
    Mark of the mental(refers to intentionality as the defining feature of minds)
    A characteristic or feature that clearly identifies something as a mental state or thought process, distinguishing it from non-mental things.
    Physicalist(describes a philosophical position being critiqued in this argument)
    The view that everything that exists is ultimately made of physical matter and can be explained by physics.

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    Semantic apparatus(refers to the methods used to account for directedness toward objects)
    The tools or framework used to explain meaning—basically, the system we use to understand how words, thoughts, and concepts refer to things in the world.
    entails(describes a logical relationship between statements)
    Logically forces or guarantees; if A entails B, then whenever A is true, B must also be true.
    extensional(logic and philosophy of probability)
    A property of relations (like material implication) that Nagel claimed Reichenbach's probability implication lacks
    intentionality(Philosophy of mind and emotion)
    The property of being object-directed; the quality of mental states whereby they are directed at or about something
    irreducible(Personalist anthropology; distinguishes personhood from mere biological individuality)
    That which is unique and unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue of which a person is not merely an individual of a species but a personal subject.

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    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Intentionality does not pose insurmountable semantic problems.

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