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It is not the case that Burge's twin-earth cases show that relational properties partly constitute mental state individuation, directly challenging the claim's assumed scope.
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Reasons For
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1.
Twin-earth cases show *semantic* content differences, not necessarily differences in the *mental state* itself qua psychological state.
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2.
Relational properties may be *supervenant* on mental states rather than partly constituting them, preserving internalism about individuation.
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3.
The claim conflates what determines truth conditions with what determines psychological kind identity—distinct philosophical questions.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Twin-earth intuitions show identical internal states can differ in content based on external environments (water vs. H2O).
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2.
If mental states can differ based on relational properties alone, then individuating minds requires considering their causal history.
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3.
Burge's arthritis case demonstrates that social/linguistic context constitutively affects concept possession, not merely belief expression.
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