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    Carmelics

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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Candrakīrti's Mādhyamika critique holds that positing an eternally existent perfect nature (pariniṣpanna) reifies a positive absolute, reinstating the substantialist error Yogācāra claims to dissolve.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Pariniṣpanna refers to the *emptiness* of duality, not a positive entity; calling it 'reified' misrepresents what Yogācāra actually claims about perfect nature.
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    • 2.Candrakīrti's own prasaṅgika position relies on conventional analysis that may not invalidate other schools' technical distinctions without additional premises.
      ?

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    • 3.Denying all positive characterization of reality risks nihilism; some articulation of how things ultimately are seems necessary even for Mādhyamika coherence.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Positing pariniṣpanna as eternally existent introduces an unconditioned absolute that escapes dependent origination, contradicting Yogācāra's core commitments.
      ?

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    • 2.Any positive metaphysical positing—even of 'perfect nature'—risks reifying concepts into independent substances, reintroducing the substantialism Mādhyamika aims to eliminate.
      ?

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    • 3.Candrakīrti's two-truths framework requires conventional phenomena lack intrinsic nature; an eternal pariniṣpanna would possess precisely the intrinsic nature to be rejected.
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