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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā demonstrates that mind-only doctrines cannot coherently distinguish veridical from non-veridical experience without invoking an external standard, making idealism self-undermining.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Idealists can invoke internal criteria (causal coherence, stability, intersubjective agreement) without positing external reality.
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    • 2.Candrakīrti's critique targets realist externalism but doesn't foreclose idealist responses using mind-immanent distinctions between appearances.
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    • 3.The claim assumes distinguishing veridical from non-veridical experience requires metaphysical externality, not merely functional or epistemic standards.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Mind-only systems must explain why some mental states reliably co-occur while others don't, requiring standards beyond subjective appearance.
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    • 2.Dreams and perceptions are phenomenologically identical, yet we distinguish them; this distinction demands criteria external to mind alone.
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    • 3.Without external verification, idealism cannot account for why all minds converge on shared perceptual content rather than diverging arbitrarily.
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