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    Cartesian dualism and other forms of dualism are ruled out. — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Cartesian dualism and other forms of dualism are ruled out.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Causal closure of the physical entails that any cause of a physical event must itself be physical or supervene on the physical.
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    • 2.Cartesian dualism posits mental substances that are wholly non-physical and thus cannot causally interact with physical events without violating causal closure.
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    • 3.Davidson's principle of the nomological character of causality requires causal relations to be backed by strict physical laws, which dualist mental substances cannot satisfy.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jaegwon Kim's supervenience argument demonstrates that dualist mental properties cannot have genuine downward causal efficacy without overdetermining physical effects.
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    • 2.Systematic causal overdetermination of physical events by non-physical mental substances is empirically untenable and violates parsimony constraints on metaphysical theorizing.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Causally interacting mental events must be token-identical with physical events.
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    • 2.Dualism entails that mental events are not token-identical with physical events.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation2 linked

    Related

    Cartesian dualism posits mental substances that are wholly non-physical and thus...Causal closure of the physical entails that any cause of a physical event must i...Causally interacting mental events must be token-identical with physical events.Davidson's principle of the nomological character of causality requires causal r...
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    Dualism entails that mental events are not token-identical with physical events.Jaegwon Kim's supervenience argument demonstrates that dualist mental properties...Systematic causal overdetermination of physical events by non-physical mental su...

    Similar

    Leibniz's rejection of Cartesian dualism stems from denying the existe...83%If dualism is true, consciousness in at least some of its types may be...83%Property dualism may be more widespread in philosophy than its lack of...83%Arguments against physicalism are arguments for dualism82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    The structure of Davidson’s derivation of the token-identity of causally interacting mental events with physical events appears to be straightforward: causally interacting mental events (the interaction principle) must instantiate some strict law property (the cause-law principle) but mental properties are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws (the anomalism principle). So mental events must instantiate some other property, which is suitable for such inclusion. Given Davidson’s invocation of
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit