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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Cartesian intuition is not a reliable basis for arguments against functionalism, including the inverted spectrum argument

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Cartesian intuition is not discriminating — it certifies possibility across a wide range of scenarios
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    • 2.Cartesian intuition certifies scenarios that functionalists consider impossible, such as zombies, thinking rocks, and disembodied minds
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    • 3.Any inverted spectrum argument relying on Cartesian intuitions can be converted into an equally plausible and simpler argument that omits the inverted spectrum entirely
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Cartesian intuition tracks conceivability, not metaphysical possibility, and Kripke's own work shows conceivability and possibility systematically diverge.
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    • 2.If inverted spectrum arguments depend on conceivability-to-possibility inferences, they inherit this gap and cannot establish genuine modal claims against functionalism.
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    • 3.Ned Block's own distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness shows functional equivalence is compatible with phenomenal difference, making the conceivability step do no additional work.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenological method shows that intuitive reports about qualia are theory-laden and shaped by Cartesian folk psychology rather than direct phenomenal access.
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    • 2.If our intuitions about spectrum inversion are artifacts of a Cartesian conceptual framework, those intuitions cannot serve as independent evidence against functionalist theories without begging the question.
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