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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Cases of illusion and cases of delusion/hallucination are of the same basic type and warrant the same type of explanation

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Illusions require the presence of a real object causally responsible for the experience, while hallucinations involve no such external causal anchor.
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    • 2.This causal-object distinction grounds fundamentally different etiological explanations: one involves misrepresentation of something present, the other involves representation of something absent.
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    • 3.Cases with structurally different causal histories belong to different explanatory types, regardless of phenomenological similarity at the level of sense-data.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Grice's causal theory and disjunctivist accounts (McDowell, Hinton) jointly show that the move from phenomenal indistinguishability to same-type explanation is a non-sequitur.
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    • 2.Two events can be phenomenally identical yet differ in their constitutive conditions, as the veridical and hallucinatory cases differ in what metaphysically constitutes them.
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    • 3.Ayer and Ayer-style sense-datum theorists beg the question by presupposing that shared phenomenology entails shared ontological and explanatory category.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.In the illusion case, the erroneous perceptual judgment is explained by appeal to sense-data rather than a directly experienced environmental feature
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    • 2.Once illusion is explained via sense-data, the illusion case cannot be distinguished from the delusion case by appealing to the presence of an environmental feature in the former and its absence in the latter
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    • 3.When two cases cannot be distinguished by the most salient candidate distinguishing feature, it is natural to treat them as the same basic type
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.