Skip to content
Carmelics
Topics
Thinkers
Changes
Contributors
Loading account…
Statements
321,452
Perspectives
108,905
Topics
42
Home
/
Original
/
inverse
See Original
Inverse View
It is not the case that Causal-informational theories (Dretske, Fodor) ground belief content in reliable causal covariations with external states, independent of linguistic meaning.
?
Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.
Reasons For
1 perspective
Reason for
?
1.
The disjunction problem: a belief reliably caused by barns also responds to barn-facades, but content is determinate, not disjunctive.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Counterfactual content (thoughts about unicorns, Zeus) have no reliable causal covariations; pure causal theories cannot ground such content.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Content seems partly individuated by conceptual role and inferential relations, not exhausted by external causal dependencies.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Reasons Against
1 perspective
Reason against
?
1.
Content must ground in mind-independent facts; reliable causal covariations provide this grounding without circularity.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Infants and animals have beliefs without language, suggesting content derives from causal-informational relations, not linguistic meaning.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Explanatory power: causal-informational theories explain why false beliefs misrepresent and why learning updates beliefs based on reliable feedback.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Next step
Based on where you are in your exploration
Strongest counterpoint
Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.