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Inverse View
It is not the case that Causal powers ontology (Molnar, Bird) grounds dispositional properties in objects without invoking substantial forms as metaphysically primitive.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Grounding dispositions in causal powers merely relocates the problem—what grounds the powers themselves if not substantial forms?
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2.
The claim that powers avoid invoking substantial forms is undermined if powers are themselves treated as primitive metaphysical features.
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3.
Without appeal to intrinsic categorical bases, causal powers risk collapsing into bare dispositionalism, leaving objects explanatorily hollow.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Causal powers avoid positing substantial forms by grounding dispositions in intrinsic properties objects actually possess.
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2.
This approach preserves dispositional realism while maintaining parsimony—no multiply realized essences needed.
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3.
Powers explain why objects behave as they do without retreating to mysterious intrinsic natures independent of causation.
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