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    'Chimaera' and 'persona' do not refer to any common natur... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→Terms like 'chimaera' and 'persona' are common in a less proper way.

    'Chimaera' and 'persona' do not refer to any common nature existing in re.

    Philosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of Language

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    'Chimaera' and 'persona' signify in a universal mode.Terms like 'chimaera' and 'persona' are common in a less proper way.

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    'Chimaera' and 'persona' signify in a universal mode.81%

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    'Homo' signifies a common nature existing in re.79%
    They may nonetheless refer to a common nature existing in re.77%
    Terms like 'chimaera' and 'persona' are common in a less proper way.75%

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    SEP: sharpe
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    As is evident, Sharpe’s analysis of the types of universality for linguistic terms is based on two distinct but compatible criteria: (i) the existence of a common nature directly or indirectly signified by them, and (ii) the universal mode of signifying – the latter being more important than the former. Thus, based on the satisfaction of these two criteria, Sharpe himself reduces the preceding division of the kinds of universality to a threefold partition: (i) terms that signify in a universal m

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