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It is not the case that Churchland's eliminative materialism holds that folk-psychological attitude terms, including 'belief', may not carve neural reality at its joints.
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Reasons For
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1.
Multiple realizability: beliefs could be multiply realized in neural substrates, making them real despite lacking single neural signature.
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2.
Folk-psychological terms succeed predictively and explanatorily across contexts, suggesting they capture something real about cognitive architecture.
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3.
Eliminativism requires showing folk psychology is false, but showing imperfect neural mapping doesn't entail falsity of psychological descriptions.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Neuroscience discovers brain properties (neural correlates, firing patterns) that don't map cleanly onto folk categories like 'belief'.
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2.
Folk psychology may be a useful social tool without tracking real natural kinds, similar to how 'jade' groups distinct minerals.
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3.
Our best future neuroscience may explain cognition without referencing propositional attitudes at all.
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