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    Classical foundationalism seeks an alternative to phenome... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If the making-probable relation is necessary, the proposal has too much in common with phenomenal conservatism to be attractive from the standpoint of classical foundationalism.

    Classical foundationalism seeks an alternative to phenomenal conservatism.

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    A necessary making-probable relation functions similarly to the necessity struct...A view too similar to phenomenal conservatism fails to offer a distinct classica...If the making-probable relation is necessary, the proposal has too much in commo...

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    A view too similar to phenomenal conservatism fails to offer a distinc...88%Privilege foundationalism holds that only beliefs about which we are i...79%Privilege foundationalism and DB foundationalism classify belief (H) d...77%If the making-probable relation is necessary, the proposal has too muc...76%

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    Tucker (2016) presents a dilemma for this proposal: Either the relevant making probable relation is contingent, or it is necessary. If it is contingent, then the justification will be inferential, and so the principle can’t account for misleading noninferential justification. If it is necessary, then (like (2)), the principle has too much in common with phenomenal conservatism to be attractive from the point of view of classical foundationalism. A plausible reply would grasp the second horn: Unl

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