Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Colors do not look like the sorts of dispositional proper... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Aesthetics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→The dispositional thesis about color is false because colors do not look the way they are said dispositionally to be

    Colors do not look like the sorts of dispositional properties they would have to be if the dispositional thesis were correct

    AestheticsPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    AestheticsPerception

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Aesthetics
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    The dispositional thesis about color is false because colors do not look the way...When we see an object as red, we see it as having a simple, monadic, local prope...

    Similar

    McGinn's argument against dispositionalism rests on specific assumptio...82%The dispositional thesis about color is false because colors do not lo...82%The dispositionalist thesis, as usually formulated, is subject to circ...80%Kulvicki's dispositional theory cannot account for the intuition that ...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: color
    View source passageHide passage
    Levin 2000 has provided a powerful reply, on behalf of the dispositionalist, to McGinn’s argument. Her challenge is complex, highlighting the assumptions that underpin McGinn’s criticism (and has a detailed discussion of the relevance of the doctrine of Revelation). An important question seems to remain, however. In McGinn’s formulation of the phenomenological problem, there are two distinct claims, each of which is crucial: (1) Colors do not look like the sorts of dispositional properties they

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective