Commitment through concern for reputation is not perfectl... — Carmelics

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Commitment through concern for reputation is not perfectly effective as a mechanism for ensuring cooperative behavior.

Moral Responsibility Social Contract

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1.Reputation mechanisms require common knowledge of agent rationality and payoff structures, conditions Gauthier and Parfit identify as rarely obtaining in real social contexts.
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2.When agents face uncertainty about others' discount rates or time horizons, reputational signals become epistemically unreliable and cannot guarantee cooperative equilibria.
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3.Hume's observation that self-interest is notoriously shortsighted entails that agents systematically underweight future reputational costs against present defection gains.
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