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Common knowledge of rationality is satisfiable by any mod... — Carmelics

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Challenges→The single-state epistemic-probability model assigning profile (u, l) does not satisfy common knowledge of rationality in the relevant sense.

Common knowledge of rationality is satisfiable by any model where each player's strategy is a best response given their actual beliefs, without requiring caution.

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Reasons For

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Reason for

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1.Rationality requires only that agents maximize utility given their beliefs, not that they hold particular beliefs about others' rationality.
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2.Common knowledge of rationality is unnecessarily restrictive; best-response play occurs whenever each agent's strategy optimizes their payoff given actual expectations.
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3.Caution (conservative play) is a choice some rational agents might reject; rationality permits risk-taking given sufficiently optimistic but reasonable beliefs.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

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1.If players hold heterogeneous or false beliefs about others' rationality, coordination failures and welfare losses emerge that undermine mutual optimization claims.
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2.Without common knowledge assumptions, there's no guarantee that each agent's beliefs about others' beliefs align, creating vulnerability to exploitation or strategic instability.
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3.Best-response logic presupposes stable expectations; without shared understanding that all players are rational, beliefs can cascade unpredictably across strategic reasoning levels.
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Key Terms

knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.): Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

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2 topics

Truth & Knowledge1 linked Skepticism1 linked

Related

Best-response logic presupposes stable expectations; without shared understandin...Caution (conservative play) is a choice some rational agents might reject; ratio...Common knowledge of rationality is unnecessarily restrictive; best-response play...If players hold heterogeneous or false beliefs about others' rationality, coordi...

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Rationality requires only that agents maximize utility given their beliefs, not ...The single-state epistemic-probability model assigning profile (u, l) does not s...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit

Without common knowledge assumptions, there's no guarantee that each agent's bel...