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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Compatibilists who admit causal moral luck must also acce... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Compatibilists who admit causal moral luck must also accept constitutive and circumstantial moral luck

    Moral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Compatibilists admit the existence of causal moral luck
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    • 2.Causal luck is exhausted by constitutive luck and circumstantial luck
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Compatibilists can distinguish causal luck in resultant outcomes from luck in the formation of character or circumstances that ground agency.
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    • 2.Constitutive luck concerns the self that acts, while causal luck concerns external causal chains—these are conceptually separable domains.
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    • 3.A compatibilist can hold that what matters morally is the agent's reasons-responsiveness, which is not itself undermined by admitting resultant luck.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.P2 assumes a causal closure principle that exhausts agential luck into constitutive and circumstantial kinds, but this begs the question against compatibilist accounts of agency.
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    • 2.Gary Watson and Susan Wolf argue that self-governing agents possess evaluative capacities that are not fully reducible to antecedent constitutive or circumstantial causal factors.
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    Moral Responsibility

    Related

    A compatibilist can hold that what matters morally is the agent's reasons-respon...Causal luck is exhausted by constitutive luck and circumstantial luckCompatibilists admit the existence of causal moral luckCompatibilists can distinguish causal luck in resultant outcomes from luck in th...
    +3 moreShow less
    Constitutive luck concerns the self that acts, while causal luck concerns extern...Gary Watson and Susan Wolf argue that self-governing agents possess evaluative c...P2 assumes a causal closure principle that exhausts agential luck into constitut...

    Similar

    Compatibilists admit the existence of causal moral luck91%Our reactions to moral luck can themselves be virtuous.81%Causal luck is exhausted by constitutive luck and circumstantial luck81%Arriving at correct moral content is substantially a matter of luck.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-luck
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    A large group who accept moral luck do not explicitly address the problem of moral luck as so formulated because they focus on what Nagel identifies as a narrower issue, namely, that of free will. One traditional problem of free will is posed by the following line of reasoning: if determinism is true, then no one can act freely, and, assuming that freedom is necessary for responsibility, no one can be responsible for their actions. Compatibilists have argued that we can act freely and responsibl
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit