Skip to content
Carmelics
Topics
Thinkers
Changes
Contributors
Loading account…
Statements
321,452
Perspectives
108,905
Topics
42
Home
/
Original
/
inverse
See Original
Inverse View
It is not the case that Connexive theses like Aristotle's can be evaluated under possible-worlds semantics without assigning them probability 1, undermining the empirical argument.
?
Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.
Reasons For
1 perspective
Reason for
?
1.
If connexive theses lack probability 1, they fail to capture Aristotle's intended doctrine that contradictory antecedents make conditionals necessarily false.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Possible-worlds semantics requires determining which worlds are accessible; connexive logic's constraints become ad hoc without empirical grounding.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Assigning sub-certainty to logical principles undermines their function as constraints on valid reasoning, collapsing into mere conventions.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Reasons Against
1 perspective
Reason against
?
1.
Possible-worlds semantics can model necessity without probability 1 by restricting truth across accessible worlds, not requiring absolute certainty.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Aristotle's connexive theses describe logical constraints on conditionals, which are evaluable as true in some worlds without empirical universality.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
The empirical argument conflates metaphysical necessity with empirical frequency, but logical truths need not hold in all actual cases.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Next step
Based on where you are in your exploration
Strongest counterpoint
Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.