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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Consequentialism cannot properly recognize the value of f... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Consequentialism cannot properly recognize the value of friendship

    ConsequentialismVirtue Ethics
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bernard Williams argued that consequentialism demands we adopt an impartial standpoint that severs the 'ground projects' constitutive of personal identity.
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    • 2.Genuine friendship requires partial, non-fungible commitments to particular individuals that cannot be derived from impartial maximization.
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    • 3.Any framework that treats one's friend merely as a locally efficient conduit for global welfare-maximization fails to recognize the friend as such, only their instrumental contribution.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Railton's sophisticated consequentialism permits partiality only instrumentally, because caring directly about loved ones typically produces better aggregate outcomes.
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    • 2.This justification makes friendship's value contingent on empirical facts about aggregate welfare, meaning friendship would be abandoned whenever impartial calculation demanded it.
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    • 3.A relationship whose normative standing can be revoked by aggregate calculation is not friendship but a welfare-conditional alliance, which is a categorically different kind of relationship.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Teleological conceptions of value understand states of affairs to have intrinsic value, and recognition of such value gives reasons to bring those states into existence and promote them
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    • 2.Friendship involves reasons—such as loyalty—that are not teleological in nature
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    • 3.Therefore, the value of friendship does not fit into the teleological conception of value presupposed by consequentialism
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    A relationship whose normative standing can be revoked by aggregate calculation ...Any framework that treats one's friend merely as a locally efficient conduit for...Bernard Williams argued that consequentialism demands we adopt an impartial stan...Friendship involves reasons—such as loyalty—that are not teleological in nature
    +5 moreShow less
    Genuine friendship requires partial, non-fungible commitments to particular indi...Railton's sophisticated consequentialism permits partiality only instrumentally,...Teleological conceptions of value understand states of affairs to have intrinsic...Therefore, the value of friendship does not fit into the teleological conception...This justification makes friendship's value contingent on empirical facts about ...

    Similar

    This conception of friendship's value is at odds with the teleological...85%The moral value of friendship cannot properly be appreciated except as...85%Love has the same social value as friendship85%Scanlon's argument presupposes a conception of friendship's value as s...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: friendship
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    The discussion of friendship and moral theories has so far concentrated on the nature of practical reason. A similar debate focuses on the nature of value. Scanlon (1998) uses friendship to argue against what he calls teleological conceptions of values presupposed by consequentialism. The teleological view understands states of affairs to have intrinsic value, and our recognition of such value provides us with reasons to bring such states of affairs into existence and to sustain and promote them
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit