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    Contingent beings possibly exist — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→It must be at least possible for God, as a necessary being, to exist

    Contingent beings possibly exist

    Modality & Possibility
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    Modality & Possibility

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    Natural Theology2 linked

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    It must be at least possible for God, as a necessary being, to exist

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
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    Necessary beings exist in all possible worlds87%Socrates does exist in those possible worlds.84%If God's existence is possible, it follows necessarily that God exists...83%Possibilia are said to exist in non-actual possible worlds81%

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    SEP: natural-theology
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    What has yet to be dealt with, clearly, is Mersenne’s problem above—(C), that the real possibility of a most perfect being cannot be demonstrated. Leibniz offers several types of arguments against this. One relies on the fact that other things are clearly possible, together with the claim that only a necessary being provides a satisfactory ground or explanation for the possible existence of contingent beings. So on the assumption that contingent beings possibly exist, it must be at least possibl

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