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    Counterfactual conditionals are not true cognitions — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→Counterfactual conditionals do not have a truth-value

    Counterfactual conditionals are not true cognitions

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Counterfactual conditionals are not false eitherCounterfactual conditionals do not have a truth-value

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    Counterfactual conditionals are not false either87%But that conditional is not false82%Counterfactual conditionals do not have a truth-value82%Truth-conditional theories of meaning hold that meaning is given by sp...81%

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    SEP: early-modern-india
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    One main function of tarka is said to be the elimination of doubt. Suppose one has the doubt “Is x F?”. One might then judge “if x is not F then x is not G”, and if one also knows that x is G, it will follow that x is F. The Naiyāyikas recognise this function but deny nevertheless that tarka is a source of knowledge (pramāṇa). Their reason, it seems, is that there is a distinction between citing positive empirical evidence for a thesis and merely eliminating the contrary possibility by a priori

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