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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Crisp's account of an invariant core around which moral v... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Crisp's account of an invariant core around which moral variability is built does not succeed

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's phronesis requires context-sensitive judgment precisely because no fixed virtues can predetermine right action across all situations.
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    • 2.If practical wisdom must adjudicate between competing virtues situationally, no virtue can serve as an invariant structural core rather than a defeasible consideration.
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    • 3.Crisp's invariant core collapses the distinction between virtues as stable dispositions and virtues as action-guiding principles, conflating two distinct normative roles.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.McDowell's perceptualist account demonstrates that moral salience is irreducibly particular, making any invariant feature a theoretical imposition on moral phenomenology.
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    • 2.If the moral relevance of a feature like honesty can be silenced rather than merely outweighed in certain cases, as Dancy argues, it lacks the invariance Crisp's core requires.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Crisp's position attempts to explain why particularist variability must be built around an invariant core
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    • 2.The supposed virtues Crisp identifies do not in fact play the role required by his account
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    Aristotle's phronesis requires context-sensitive judgment precisely because no f...Crisp's invariant core collapses the distinction between virtues as stable dispo...Crisp's position attempts to explain why particularist variability must be built...If practical wisdom must adjudicate between competing virtues situationally, no ...
    +3 moreShow less
    If the moral relevance of a feature like honesty can be silenced rather than mer...McDowell's perceptualist account demonstrates that moral salience is irreducibly...The supposed virtues Crisp identifies do not in fact play the role required by h...

    Similar

    Crisp's position attempts to explain why particularist variability mus...81%Particularists argue that virtues like considerateness and cruelty do ...78%Identifying a few invariant reasons does not show that moral thought d...78%A viable defense of moral generalism must explain why morality require...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-particularism
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    What is at issue between particularism and generalism is the nature of moral rationality. Particularists maintain that there can be reasons—moral reasons—even if the features that give us those reasons function variably rather than invariably in their reason-giving. Generalists suppose that this is not possible. They claim either that all reasons, when properly understood, must function invariably, or that there is an invariant core even if there is a variable periphery. To argue for the first
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit