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Inverse View
It is not the case that D1 and its revision thus differ in cognitive grain, making equivalence fail for minds sensitive to representational differences.
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Reason for
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1.
Equivalence requires sameness of relevant properties; cognitive grain may be epistemically inaccessible and causally inert.
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2.
All actual minds may be insensitive to representational grain differences if they only track functional/causal roles, not intrinsic structure.
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3.
Cognitive grain distinctions risk being purely stipulative without empirical evidence that any mind actually discriminates them.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Cognitive grain concerns how finely mental representations discriminate: D1 and its revision differ in discriminatory structure.
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2.
Minds sensitive to representational differences can detect and respond to fine-grained distinctions that functionally identical states make.
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3.
If two representations have different cognitive grain, they produce different mental states for cognitively discriminating systems.
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