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    D2A4 is one of the Arguments of D2 — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
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    Supports→D2A4 is logically dependent on both Causality and No Causation by Contraries

    D2A4 is one of the Arguments of D2

    Natural Theology
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    D2A4 is logically dependent on both Causality and No Causation by Contraries

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    D2A4's validity requires the truth of No Causation by Contraries
    D2A4's validity requires the truth of the Causality principle

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    D2A12 is one of the Arguments of D2100%The Supreme Good is the Supreme Being.83%God, for Fârâbî, does not fall under any Aristotelian category.78%All other Forms exist by participating in the Form of the Good.77%

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    SEP: plato-parmenides
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    It appears that every Argument of D2 is logically valid. (However, see Gill (1996, 64, n. 107), who contends that D2A8 and D2A9 are fallacious, and Patterson (1999, 98–100), who argues that D2A8 is fallacious.)) Like the Arguments of D1, the Arguments of D2 rest on a large number of independent premises, including many of the independent premises of D1. Again, most of these premises are, at least from Plato’s point of view, either definitionally true or self-evident. (Gill (1996, 83–84) objects

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