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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that David Armstrong and David Lewis's functionalist realism holds that higher-order properties are type-identical to the physical realizer-types within a given world, preserving type physicalism locally.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If pain is type-identical to C-fiber firing in world W but to different neurons in world W*, the property 'pain' lacks unified metaphysical status.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Local type-identity seems to conflate conceptual identity-conditions with metaphysical identity, leaving explanation of cross-world mental continuity unclear.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Functionalism's defining feature—multiple realizability—is genuinely incompatible with type-identity, not merely preserved by restricting scope locally.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Type physicalism avoids epiphenomenalism by identifying mental properties with physical bases, ensuring causally efficacious mental states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Within-world type-identity preserves local physical completeness while allowing multiple realizability across possible worlds.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Armstrong and Lewis's framework respects functional role definitions without requiring global type-identity, maintaining theoretical parsimony.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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