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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that David Lewis and Timothy Williamson argue that necessitism—the thesis that necessarily everything necessarily exists—provides independent metaphysical grounds for BF's truth across all modal systems.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Necessitism conflicts with intuitive modal thinking: it's conceptually bizarre that merely possible objects necessarily exist in our world.
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    • 2.BF's modal validity doesn't require necessitism; weaker domain constraints (e.g., constant domains per world) achieve logical validity without metaphysical excess.
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    • 3.If necessitism grounds BF universally, this reverses explanatory direction—BF should ground necessitism only if necessitism is independently justified.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If all possible objects exist necessarily, then quantifiers range uniformly across all modal systems, making BF logically valid everywhere.
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    • 2.Necessitism eliminates the metaphysical oddity of objects popping in and out of existence across possible worlds, grounding modal logic in unified ontology.
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    • 3.Lewis's counterpart theory requires a stable domain of all entities; necessitism provides this without ad-hoc restrictions on quantifier domains.
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