Davidson's anomalous monism similarly entails that mental content is individuated holistically, making self-referential thought ascriptions immune to the divergence TC requires for epistemic failure.
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A weakened competence premise in the Conditional Jury Theorem, replacing the original unconditional competence assumption with a conditional one
anomalous monism(Davidson's position distinguishing it from standard type identity theories)
A form of token identity theory holding that mental events are identical to physical events, but mental descriptions do not participate in strict causal laws due to the anomalous (non-law-governed) nature of intentional predicates.
epistemic failure(describing a problem with what we know)
A failure in knowledge or understanding—when we don't know something we should, or we believe something false.
mental content(Davidsonian account)
The content of propositional mental states such as belief, determined through causal relations between speakers and objects in the world and through the rational integration of speakers' behaviour.