Davidson's demand for physical conditions in strict psychophysical laws proves too much, as it would equally dissolve the lawhood of all special-science generalizations, not just psychological ones.
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Contingent laws linking the occurrence of neural events of certain kinds with occurrences of qualitative events (qualia), held by epiphenomenalists to be independent of physical laws
special-science generalizations(the other types of laws that would be affected by Davidson's demands)
Broad patterns or rules discovered in sciences like biology, chemistry, or psychology—sciences that study specific levels of complexity rather than just fundamental physics.
strict(describing the kind of psychophysical laws Davidson requires)
In this context, it means absolute or allowing no exceptions—a strict law has no cases where it fails to apply.