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Inverse View
It is not the case that Davidson's own reliance on supervenience presupposes a systematic covariance that implicitly demands the kind of identifications AM claims to avoid.
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Reason for
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1.
Supervenience permits correlation without identity; B-properties can depend on A-properties without reducing to or being identified with them.
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2.
Systematic covariance describes dependency relationships, not metaphysical identifications; AM explicitly allows this distinction.
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3.
Davidson's view avoids mental-physical identity while accepting psychophysical supervenience; this is a coherent position, not an implicit contradiction.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Supervenience requires that identical physical states always produce identical mental states, establishing systematic covariance patterns.
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2.
Systematic covariance presupposes reliable mappings between mental and physical properties, implicitly identifying them as correlated pairs.
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3.
Anomalous Monism denies such identity relations, making supervenience logically incoherent as its foundational commitment.
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