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It is not the case that De Finetti's representation theorem shows probability-1 assignments encode genuine epistemic commitments, not mere notational shortcuts.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
De Finetti's theorem merely formalizes betting behavior consistency; this says nothing about whether assignments represent metaphysical or epistemic reality.
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2.
Any consistent probability assignment (including those avoiding probability-1) satisfies coherence; distinguishing one requires external philosophical assumptions.
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3.
The theorem applies equally to subjective assignments agents construct as shortcuts; formal coherence doesn't entail the assignments aren't notational artifacts.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
De Finetti's theorem derives probability-1 from rational coherence conditions, not arbitrary convention, grounding them in genuine belief structure.
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2.
Probability-1 assignments have decision-theoretic consequences (infinite betting ratios), making them substantively different from lower probabilities.
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3.
Exchangeability assumptions reflect real empirical commitments about symmetry, not mere notational convenience or linguistic choice.
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