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    Deep-conflict cases are not properly understood as self-d... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Deep-conflict cases are not properly understood as self-deception

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Genuine deception requires a deceiver who holds a belief that p while intentionally inducing belief that not-p in another party.
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    • 2.In deep-conflict cases, no single cognitive agent simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs with the requisite intentional structure of deception.
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    • 3.Alfred Mele's deflationary account shows deep-conflict cases lack the intentional causation essential to deception proper, making 'self-deception' a misleading label.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Longeway's 'escapism' captures motivated belief formation via attention manipulation without requiring the paradoxical simultaneous belief structure self-deception implies.
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    • 2.Deep-conflict cases are better explained by Sartrean bad faith or Fingarette's 'disavowal of engagement'—neither of which constitutes deception in the epistemically relevant sense.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Deep-conflict cases do not obviously resemble cases of interpersonal deception
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    • 2.Without such resemblance it is mysterious why they would be considered species of the same genus as interpersonal deception
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    • 3.Deep-conflict cases more nearly resemble what Longeway calls 'escapism'
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    Related

    Alfred Mele's deflationary account shows deep-conflict cases lack the intentiona...Deep-conflict cases are better explained by Sartrean bad faith or Fingarette's '...Deep-conflict cases do not obviously resemble cases of interpersonal deceptionDeep-conflict cases more nearly resemble what Longeway calls 'escapism'
    +4 moreShow less
    Genuine deception requires a deceiver who holds a belief that p while intentiona...In deep-conflict cases, no single cognitive agent simultaneously holds contradic...Longeway's 'escapism' captures motivated belief formation via attention manipula...Without such resemblance it is mysterious why they would be considered species o...

    Similar

    Deep-conflict cases do not obviously resemble cases of interpersonal d...91%Selectivity in self-deception can be explained without positing an int...81%Deep-conflict approaches entail that holding the false belief that p d...81%Deep-conflict approaches require that the self-deceiver know the truth...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-deception
    View source passageHide passage
    The significant difference between what deflationary accounts have in view (namely, people who do not believe the unwelcome truth that ~p, having a motivation driven, unwarranted skepticism toward it), and deep conflict theorist do (namely, people who know the unwelcome truth that ~p and avoid reflecting on it or encountering evidence for it) prompts us to ask whether these phenomena belong to the same psychological kind, according to Lynch (2012). If they did, ‘self-deception’ would be rendered
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit