Dennett's heterophenomenological critique establishes that inferring a unified intentional system from behavioral flexibility conflates the intentional stance with genuine mental state possession.
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Dennett's approach to studying consciousness by combining third-person scientific observation with first-person reports, rather than trusting subjective experience alone.
Intentional system(what the statement says we're inferring from behavior)
Something (like a person, animal, or even a computer) that we can predict and explain by talking about its beliefs, desires, and goals—as if it's trying to do things on purpose.
Mental state possession(what the statement distinguishes from using the intentional stance)
Actually having real inner experiences, thoughts, and feelings (rather than just appearing to have them from the outside).
intentional stance(Dennett's terminology; used to explain how talk of 'persons' functions in folk psychology without committing to persons as metaphysically real entities)
A cognitive stance one adopts toward a system by treating it as if it has beliefs, desires, and intentions, without this stance corresponding to the system's intrinsic metaphysical properties