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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Dependence relations used in Thomasson's scheme—e.g., dependence on mental states—are themselves ontologically loaded predicates requiring prior categorical distinctions to be well-defined.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Dependence can be defined formally (in terms of counterfactuals or necessity) without presupposing contentful categorical distinctions beforehand.
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    • 2.Categories can emerge iteratively: dependence relations themselves help *constitute* and refine what counts as 'mental' or 'physical' distinctions.
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    • 3.The charge of circularity assumes categories must be fully determinate prior to use—but conceptual schemes can be partially self-supporting and coherent.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Dependence relations require distinguishing between relata (what depends on what), presupposing categories like 'mental' and 'physical' already.
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    • 2.Without prior categorical commitments, 'dependence on mental states' lacks determinate meaning—any entity could trivially depend on anything.
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    • 3.Thomasson's framework uses dependence to derive categories, but this is circular if dependence itself requires those categories to be intelligible.
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