Derek Parfit and others in the fitting-attitudes tradition hold that all genuine value comparisons reduce to rankings of reasons, and any apparent 'on a par' cases reflect agent-relative permissibility rather than an objective fourth value relation.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
An ideal object, something like a state of affairs or proposition, which can be expressed by an independent sentence (e.g., 'Red is a color') when judged or assumed, or by a 'that'-clause or nominal phrase when judged about.
on a par(Chang's terminology for the parity relation)
The relational status of two options A and B when parity holds: they are comparable but not ordered by the standard three relations
rankings of reasons(what value comparisons allegedly reduce to)
Lists of the best arguments or justifications for something, ordered from most to least important or compelling.
value comparisons(what the statement says reduce to rankings of reasons)
Statements where you decide which things are better, worse, or equal in terms of how much they matter or how good they are.