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Inverse View
It is not the case that Deriving normative force from a teleological fact about natural inclinations still moves from 'is' (what nature seeks) to 'ought' (what reason prescribes).
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Describing what nature seeks (an 'is') differs logically from prescribing what reason requires (an 'ought'), regardless of teleological framing.
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2.
Many natural inclinations conflict with reasoned moral demands; normativity cannot derive solely from what we are inclined toward doing.
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3.
Teleological facts about nature require independent justification for why they should guide human conduct rather than be merely descriptive.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Hume's is-ought gap assumes facts and values are categorically distinct, but teleological facts inherently embed evaluative content about ends.
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2.
Natural inclinations reveal what humans are constitutively oriented toward; reason discovering these orientations prescribes fulfilling our nature.
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3.
All normative systems presuppose some foundational fact about what matters; teleology grounds normativity without additional metaphysical commitments.
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