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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Descartes and Hume demand certainty about the external world, not certainty about one's own cognitive states, showing skepticism need not ascend to meta-knowledge.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Descartes' certainty about thought presupposes knowledge of what 'thinking' is—a meta-cognitive grasp of cognitive states themselves.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Hume cannot distinguish his perceptions from hallucinations without some certainty about how perception relates to reality—unavoidably meta-level.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Any skeptical doubt about external world requires the doubter to understand their own doubt, which necessarily involves meta-knowledge of cognition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Descartes' cogito establishes indubitability of thought itself without requiring certainty about external objects or their properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Hume's bundle theory treats perceptions as directly knowable while remaining agnostic about external substances, separating epistemological levels.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Skepticism about the external world operates at the object-level; claims about one's own mental states need not invoke meta-cognitive knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.