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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    42
    Dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminishe... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminished or lost through vice nor increased through virtue.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Dignity does not depend on how well or badly the capacities for moral agency are exercised.
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    • 2.Dignity does not depend on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good character.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's eudaimonism holds that human dignity is constituted by the actualization of our rational and moral capacities, not merely their possession.
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    • 2.An agent who systematically degrades their rational agency through vice progressively undermines the very faculty that grounds their dignity.
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    • 3.Therefore, dignity as actualized excellence admits of degrees corresponding to how well one exercises the capacities definitive of human flourishing.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant himself distinguishes between humanity as mere capacity and the worth earned by acting from duty, suggesting moral conduct is dignity-conferring.
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    • 2.If dignity were entirely insensitive to moral conduct, the Kantian notion that treating persons as ends-in-themselves imposes obligations on the agent would lose its normative force.
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    An agent who systematically degrades their rational agency through vice progress...Aristotle's eudaimonism holds that human dignity is constituted by the actualiza...Dignity does not depend on how well or badly the capacities for moral agency are...Dignity does not depend on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good c...
    +3 moreShow less
    If dignity were entirely insensitive to moral conduct, the Kantian notion that t...Kant himself distinguishes between humanity as mere capacity and the worth earne...Therefore, dignity as actualized excellence admits of degrees corresponding to h...

    Similar

    Dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminished through mor...89%Health is not a virtue and does not contribute to virtue.81%Wisdom is a virtue that essentially involves the will, not merely the ...78%The human being has the capacity for virtue and the capacity for vice.78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: respect
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    There are several important consequences of the Kantian view of the scope of moral recognition respect for persons as persons. First, while all normally functioning human beings possess the rational capacities that ground recognition respect, there can be humans in whom these capacities are altogether absent and who therefore, on this view, are not persons and are not owed respect. Second, these capacities could, in principle, be possessed by beings who are not biologically human, and such being
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit