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    Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds ... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds cast doubt on C1 but not on B1

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There is an enormous epistemological difference between the arguments B1 and C1
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    • 2.Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds cannot cast doubt on B1
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    • 3.Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds can cast doubt on C1
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment applies uniformly: quantifying over any entity in a true sentence commits us to that entity's existence.
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    • 2.If B1 quantifies over possible states or ways things could be, it incurs the same modal ontological debt as C1, differing only in notational transparency.
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    • 3.The epistemological asymmetry between B1 and C1 is therefore superficial, not structural, as both arguments presuppose a modal ontology to ground their truth conditions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's possible worlds semantics demonstrates that even actualist-friendly modal frameworks must posit truthmakers for modal claims that go beyond the actual world.
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    • 2.Any argument of the B1 form that makes irreducible modal claims cannot escape the ontological commitments that generate skepticism about C1, since both require modal truthmakers.
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    Topics

    SkepticismModality & Possibility

    Related

    Any argument of the B1 form that makes irreducible modal claims cannot escape th...Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds can cast doubt on C1Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds cannot cast doubt on B1If B1 quantifies over possible states or ways things could be, it incurs the sam...
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    Kripke's possible worlds semantics demonstrates that even actualist-friendly mod...Quine's criterion of ontological commitment applies uniformly: quantifying over ...The epistemological asymmetry between B1 and C1 is therefore superficial, not st...There is an enormous epistemological difference between the arguments B1 and C1

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
    View source passageHide passage
    there is an enormous epistemological difference between the arguments. … doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds cannot cast doubt on B1, but can cast doubt on C1. (Jackson 1989: 197–8)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit